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Past interest in the phenomena of Public interest litigation has concentrated on a legal justification of 
PIL and on arguments based on “access to Justice” for the poor. There seems to be scant literature 
that looks at PIL from a Law and Economics perspective. This paper sets up a framework to 
analyze the economic efficiency of public Interest Litigation in the Indian context. We argue that 
PIL can be justified as an economically efficient choice of redressel if certain conditions are fulfilled. 
These are, insufficient incentive for private litigation, regulatory failures and the inability of class 
action to counter harm due to high transaction costs. Thus PIL is seen as an efficient method of 
bundling interests wherever there are failures of the kind mentioned. We delineate the kinds of 
economic activity that generate these specific conditions and analyze if PIL has been successful in 
such cases. We show that PILs filed in India do seem to stem from considerations of Economic 
efficiency, but there are instances where PIL may be used strategically to pull off private ends and 
open up a floodgate of litigation. We present only a basic direction of the research since this is still a 
part of on going research. 
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Introduction 
We analyze the feasibility and efficiency of legal instruments that facilitate in obtaining legal 
redress for suffering harm. In doing so, we focus on the efficacy of Public Interest 
Litigations (PILs) in resolving problems in the Indian context. Theoretically the legal 
alternatives that can be used to contain harmful activities vary from private bipolar litigation 
to class action to regulation. While there has been an economic analysis of bipolar litigation 
(Shavell, 2003) and class action (Silver, 2000), and regulation (Spulber, 1988), there seems to 
be scant literature that looks at PIL from a Law and Economics perspective. 
Past interest in the phenomena of Public Interest Litigation has concentrated on a legal 
justification of PIL based on arguments of “access to Justice” for the underprivileged masses 
(Baxi, 1987; Desai and Muralidhar, 2000). This paper sets up a framework to analyze the 
economic efficiency of Public Interest Litigation in the Indian context. We make use of the 
literature on the bundling of special interests to argue that PIL can be justified as an 
economically efficient choice of redressel if there is insufficient incentive for private 
litigation, inability of class action to counter harm due to high transaction costs, lack of 
substantive law on regulation of the harm and/ or pervasive regulatory failures. Thus PIL is 
seen as an efficient method of bundling interests wherever there are failures of the kind 
mentioned. Environmental harm is seen to generate these specific conditions and therefore 
we would expect that PIL would serve to circumvent the above problems and would 
succeed in bundling special interests in a cost-minimizing manner to bring legal injunctions 
or compensations for harm done3. However, in order to assess whether PILs are an efficient 
alternative, it must first be proved that the other forms of legal actions are either too 
expensive or that there is a lack of substantive law to correct the harmful activity or that 
there are failures in regulation that have been in place that make the PIL alternative more 
efficient. Secondly, it must also be assessed whether PIL would be misused as a strategy to 
further private ends and open up a floodgate of litigation. We present the first part of the 
research in this paper.  
                                                 
3 The data on PILs filed in India does suggest that this approach for redressel has been increasingly used in 
cases of environmental problems; of the 700 cases of PILs collected as the part of this research project 
more than 50% are on environmental issues.   
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The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop the hypothesis that Public 
Interest Litigation, under certain conditions, could result in a cost-minimizing alternative to 
resolve environmental problems and suggest a methodology by which the economic 
efficiency of Public Interest Litigation can be deduced. This section also recounts the 
evolution of PILs in India. In Section III we present information in the Delhi Air-pollution 
case to show that class action was not pursued as means of redressel and the regulatory 
mechanism failed, but PIL made a difference in controlling pollution in the city.  
II 
A) The Efficiency of Public Interest Litigation  
When adequate statutes and laws are in place, judicial machinery is corruption-free and the 
victims are aware of their legal rights, justice can be efficiently imparted through 
conventional private litigations.4 Alternatively, legislative measures in the form of regulatory 
acts may be taken to check socially damaging activities (Spulber, 1988).  
However, in the context of developing countries, private litigation does not seem to have 
been successful in protecting citizens from unwarranted actions of tort, particularly when 
negative externalities such as environmental pollution are present. One reason for this is that 
going to court may not even be a matter of choice to a large number of affected people who 
are unacquainted with their legal rights and, in the face of damages, simply do not have the 
means to file a case in the court5 (Desai and Muralidhar, 2000). Availing the services of 
formal Courts in the developing countries have a lot of hurdles such as illiteracy of the 
masses, hidden cost of geographical distance as only a few courts exist, adverse social and 
cultural norms that discriminate a section of the society and finally the corrupt courts. 
                                                 
4 In Ram Baj Singh Vs Babulal (AIR 1982 ALL 285), the plaintiff had accused the defendant of creating 
nuisance to him and his customers from using a brick-grinding machine. Here, since the tort feasor and the 
victim were well identified and the nature of the harm well documented, private litigation would be the 
economically efficient solution in the absence of effective regulations. 
5 In the case of Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India (AIR 1984 SC 802) the Supreme Court 
expressed its concern over the underprivileged masses who do not have access to justice for various 
reasons.   
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The problem of private litigation is magnified, when the number of victims and the total 
damages to the society are larger but the individual share of damage is not large enough to 
create incentives for private litigation. Under such conditions of rational disinterest 
(Schaefer, 2000; Ott and Schaefer, 1996) private litigation would be uneconomical for the 
victims to take up individually and, if taken, uneconomical to the society. Moreover, if the 
court verdict and the subsequent benefits were to be mixed goods i.e. consisting of both 
individual and social benefits, rational individuals would only under-invest in appropriating 
legal justice.  
Secondly, even if there were a civil liability rule in place, the outcome would be inefficient if 
the tort feasor has the opportunity of settling with the a few potential litigants in return for 
continuing his polluting activity. This small portion of the victims could become a credible 
threat and appropriate due compensation out-of-court from the tort feasor leaving the 
majority to their fate. Here only a part of the social cost is internalized by the tort feasor by 
means of paying compensation to group A. This leaves the economy still in a sub-optimal 
equilibrium where the socially damaging activity is over-supplied. On the other hand the 
possibility of Public Interest Litigation i.e. any individual with sufficient interest can file the 
case, would increase the number of potential litigants beyond the number of victims. This 
will have a deterrence effect on the potential tort feasors6. 
The next possible alternative advised is regulating the economic activities of the agents such 
that they internalize these externalities. Regulation too is fraught with the danger of 
regulatory authority colluding with the potential injurers that would result in equally harmful 
situation (Spulber, 1988). Regulation suffers a twofold danger of legislative authorities being 
“captured” by the powerful interest groups and/ or laxity in enforcing the laws enacted by 
the designated enforcing authorities. Lobby groups “capturing the authority” can be through 
exerting pressure at the time of legislation in order to dilute law so as to minimize the 
expected damages to their interests. This would misdirect the purpose of regulation. Further, 
regulation fails if the enforcing agency is not conferred with enough power to implement 
                                                 
6 Raja and Xavier (2005) “ Efficiency and Strategic Behaviour: The case of Mass Torts” Working Paper, 
Dept. of Economics, University of Hyderabad. 
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what they are supposed to7, or when the enforcement mechanism is corrupt and the 
enforcing agent succumbs to issuing false certificates in exchange for bribes.   
To appropriate social benefits class action8 is considered to be the alternative to 
unenforceable regulation with defective regulatory mechanism and to private litigation as the 
cost of litigation could be shared among the victims9 (Epstein, 2003; Schaefer, 2000; Silver, 
2000). However, class action itself is fraught with a number of problems such as cost of 
collecting information about the victims and the damages and the cost of coordinating them 
all to achieve the collective interest. Coordination cost apart, there is also the hazard of free 
riders since the resulting judicial judgment is generally non-excludable (Bardhan, 2000). In 
other words, the transaction cost of coordinating class action is, at times, prohibitively high. 
To summarize, when large sections of the population is divorced from the formal legal 
system private litigation is inadequate; on the other hand, when there is a strong institution 
of “influence” wielded by interest groups, regulation becomes ineffective; class action is 
prohibitively costly or simply not feasible due to transaction costs. 
In the developing countries, sluggish law enforcement, the lack of substantive law, and a 
weak legal system perpetuated by large members of the population not having access to 
education created a demand for alternate dispute resolution mechanisms. Educating the 
masses is an effective but long-term solution to the problem. Providing legal aid is also not 
feasible for the reasons of sheer number of possible cases and also lack of information on 
the part of the underprivileged would still keep them out of any intended support10.  
                                                 
7 This can happen only with the collusion with the State. Typically in developing countries, pressures from 
the opposition parties or activists for some cause create conditions that compel the State to show some 
visible policy that would for in the interests of the society. However, this creates problems with interest 
groups who may have a significant influence over the people in power. The typical response is to enact 
weak legislations that leave large enough loopholes in order that the interest groups are not affected.  
8 A class action suit in the U.S won a $700 million settlement in Alabama environmental pollution case, 
where toxic industrial waste buried at the county landfill seeped into the groundwater. Another famous 
class action won against Pacific Gas and Electric for residents sickened by water contaminated with 
chromium 6. agent ornage 157.  
9 Per-plaintiff cost of engaging in litigation decreases due to economies of scale from consolidation interest 
and cost (Che, 1996; Miller, 1988) 
10 Ott and Schaefer (1996) come up with several recommendations to overcome some of these problems 
for Germany. However it is unlikely that those recommendations would be suitable for a country like India. 
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Any alternative that reduces the cost associated with the above problems would have to be 
considered as an efficient alternative. What is required is a way to bundle special interests of 
large groups of people in a cost-minimizing manner and at the same time reduce the costs of 
coordinating such interests considerably. To accommodate this some innovation in law 
would be required.  
The legal fraternity put forth an alternative that seems to coincide with the model that serves 
this very purpose and goes by the name of Public Interest Litigation (PIL). PIL, as the very 
name suggests, is meant to shield the “public interest”. It is a lawsuit filed by a representative 
plaintiff or plaintiffs on behalf of the victims against tort feasors. According to Indian law, 
the definition of Public Interest has a very broad connotation. PIL is not defined in any 
statute or in any act. Innovative judges, who consider the interest of public at large, have 
interpreted Law to overcome the inadequacy of the formal court system and private 
litigation to solve conflicts at group level. Although, the main focus of such litigation is only 
"Public Interest" there are various other areas where a PIL can be filed e.g. violation of basic 
human rights of the poor, content or conduct of government policy or compel municipal 
authorities to perform a public duty. The proponents of PIL in the United States, state three 
theoretical justifications (Hershkoff): First, PIL can be an effective means of correcting for 
any legislative lacunas developed which dilute or exclude the interest of a group of the 
population. In doing so it resolves the public choice problem of the affected parties. Second, 
PIL may also be used whenever the law on the book is ineffectively enforced. Third, it 
extends the judicial mechanism to the underprivileged. Thus, the justification for PIL comes 
not from economic considerations of efficiency, rather from concerns regarding “access to 
justice”, issues pertaining to fundamental rights and those concerns pertaining to the legal 
“empowerment” of people.  
It is a simple observation that “costs of going to court” or of litigation over a particular 
dispute or tort would depend, among other things, on the number of victims involved. 
When the nature of harm involves both a single victim and a single tort feasor, private 
litigation would be used. Larger numbers of both victims as well as tort feasors contributing 
to harm makes private litigation more expensive compared to several victims filing a suit 
together and sharing the costs. Clearly, in the absence of significant transaction costs, there 
are economies of scale to combined litigation as opposed to individual litigation. When the 
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number of victims increases even further, coordinating among the victims becomes costly. 
At times it could prohibit any kind of action from being taken. Environmental conflicts, in 
most of the cases are of a nature where the people affected are wide spread and information 
required for coordination is very large and expensive to obtain. However, the totality of 
damage becomes significant due to large numbers being affected even though individually 
they suffer a small fraction of it. A method that demands no coordination among the victims 
solves the problem of rational apathy as any individual irrespective of his/her standing in the 
case can move the court (Tiwari, 2001). 
 
                                                                ACPL 
           Cost of Litigation                                                                 ACCA 
                                                                                                              ACPIL 
                                                                                                  
                                           Dispute Zone    Conflict Zone    Large-Scale Environmental Conflict  
                                                       N1                      Ni                                Nn            
Diagram 1:  
ACPL= Average cost of private litigation;  ACCA= Average cost of class action;                       
ACPIL = Average cost public interest litigation; N = No of Individuals involved (Victims as 
well as Tort Feasors) 
The above diagram depicts the falling expected cost of litigation over alternatives as the 
number victims go up. It also indicates the zones and corresponding cost effective method 
of litigation. The case where there are few or a single victim and a few or single tort feasor is 
designated as a “dispute zone”. In such cases, the nature of the harm, and the identity of the 
victims and injurers are well established. Larger numbers being involved is designated as a 
“conflict”. Very large numbers being affected by a large number of tort feasors corresponds 
to environmental damages. This however is not confined to such harm. Any policy or 
legislation that is not in the public interest would also fall into this category. 
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We hypothesize that the cost of litigation in the case of large-scale environmental conflicts is 
lower if PIL is utilized in contrast to other alternatives in the presence of regulatory failures. 
B) The nature of PIL in India:  
The procedure for judicial review of administrative actions in the UK was revolutionized 
when locus standi was relaxed and courts sought only “sufficient interest” of the litigant as 
against " person aggrieved" (Cane, 1981)11. By relaxing locus standi it brought grievances of the 
victimized to the purview of courts and made the judicial process more participatory, 
expeditious and polycentric. In India, where the government enforcement machinery is said 
to be lax, court involvement is indispensable in ensuring due action is taken. One of the 
outstanding legal innovations in India in the nineteen seventies is the Public Interest 
Litigation (PIL). The Supreme Court (SC) thus opened its doors to the underprivileged by 
empowering any concerned citizen to voice in the court on behalf of them (Cunningham, 
1987).   
The Supreme Court of India has clearly delineated the role of court and the purpose of 
public interest litigation12: 
In Public Interest Litigation, unlike traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, there 
is no determination or adjudication of individual rights. While in the ordinary 
conventional adjudications the party structure is merely bi-polar and the controversy 
pertains to the determination of the legal consequences of past events and the 
remedy is essentially linked to and limited by the logic of the array of the parties, in a 
public interest action the proceedings cut across and transcend these traditional 
forms and inhibitions.  
The period after 1970s witnessed, due to these legal developments, a rapid growth of PIL on 
various issues such as protecting fundamental rights, environment and corruption and on 
several large-scale government projects. In the early years of judicial activism SC assumed 
                                                 
11 R. V. Inspectorate of Pollution, ex parte Green peace, Ltd. (No. 2) [1994] 4 All E R 329 (High Court, by 
Justice Otton) has granted standing to the environmental group Greenpeace in the Thorp case to challenge a 
proposed license for a nuclear power plant.   
12 Sheela Barse v. Union of India, 1988 4 SCC 226, 234, 1988 AIR (SC) 2211, 2214. 
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the role of bulwark against state repression in protecting fundamental and human rights of 
the citizens13. 
The 1990’s witnessed SC responding to people’s complaints and inaction of government 
agencies such as forest bureaucracies, pollution control boards and state agencies. Court 
activism was seen in the field of the environment for the first time in Rural Litigation and 
Entitlement Kendra case14 where the Supreme Court made use of the powers it is conferred by 
Article 32 of the constitution (Pani, 2002). SC observed that “if enactment of law results in a 
clean environment India would be the least polluted as there are at least 200 and odd Central 
and State statutes enacted.” This clearly points to the failure of the regulatory mechanism at 
the level of implementation.  
III 
Environmental Regulation and Environmental Legislation in India 
It has been argued that harm will go uncompensated if either there is a failure of the 
substantive law regulating such activity or if regulation is rendered ineffective due to capture 
and corruption. Environmental conflicts like any other disputes could be disposed by simple 
private litigation where the aggrieved party sues the injurer and compensation or injunction 
is imposed on the tort feasor under section 91 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code, if 
convicted. Ironically, India, following the legal tradition of UK, has a long history of 
government environmental activism. Indian Penal Code of 1860 on defilement of water, The 
Factories Act of 1948 required all factories to make effective arrangements for waste 
disposal and The Indian Forest Act of 1927 granted the government uncontested rights over 
natural resources and authorized state governments to oversee the protection of the forests. 
The same tradition was followed after the independence.  
                                                 
13 In Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi AIR 1981 SC 746. In Subhash 
Kumar v. State of Bihar (AIR 1991 SC 420), the Court observed that: “The right to live is a fundamental 
right under Article 21 of the Constitution, and it includes the right of enjoyment of pollution-free water and 
air for full enjoyment of life. If anything endangers or impairs that quality of life in derogation of laws, a 
citizen has the right to have recourse to Article 32 of the Constitution…” 
14 In the limestone quarries in the Mussorie Hills case (AIR 1985 SC 652), the Supreme Court ordered to 
close down the units, as they were hazardous to environment. 
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The Stockholm Conference in 1972 deeply influenced the future policies on environment 
and environmental protection. The focus had been mainly on water and air pollution and 
also to a whole range of other problems such as safeguarding public health, forests and wild 
life. Constitutional measures include the 42nd amendment of 1977 that allowed the State to 
protect and improve the environment. Directive principles of the State and fundamental 
duties of the citizens include environmental protection. The Ministry of Environment and 
Forests (MoEF) was created in 1985.  
Environmental statutes and laws are the ways in which these constitutional provisions are 
implemented. In the fallout of the Bhopal gas tragedy stringent environment laws were 
passed. In 1986 the Parliament passed the Environment Protection Act (1986) an ‘umbrella’ 
legislation providing guidance to all environmental problems. Environmental Action Plan of 
MoEF (1993) attempted to integrate environmental considerations into developmental 
strategies.  
In the event of damage citizens have civil remedies such as Common tort law action against 
the polluter and writ compelling the government agency to enforce the law and clean up, 
Application for compensation under The Public Liability Insurance Act 1991 or National 
Environment Tribunal Act 1995 and ‘Public nuisance’ under Criminal Procedure Act 1973 
and criminal complaint under section 19 of EPA. The upshot of this is show that in the 
Indian case, there is reason to believe that the law on books was quite extensive and 
substantive. Thus there is no reason to believe that an absence of law is responsible for the 
environmental problems. The problem lies with implementation and the dilution of the law 
on books that seem to be the major obstacles to conventional regulations not being in the 
public interest. Economic factors such as economies of scale that prevent private litigation in 
large scale problems and high transaction costs of class action seem to be key factors. 
Regulatory failure consists of two components:  
a) Capture by ‘influence’ and 
b) Corruption 
The first is Ex-ante capture and can occur at the time of legislation. The private interest 
theories of regulation suggest that regulation is demanded by private interest groups that 
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stand to gain from it15. In the case of environmental legislation, capture of this kind would be 
reflected in compromising with the stipulations of expert-opinions or standards in the 
enactment of the law. Thus if the standards prescribed by the experts on pollution levels do 
not get translated into legislation and instead the enacted Law that is agreed upon is set 
below the recommended one, it can be indicative of capture. The stronger is the influence of 
interest groups upon the State, the more would be the dilution from the norm that is 
recommended. 
The second aspect of regulatory failure is to do with the implementation of the (possibly 
diluted) act. This is ex-post failure. There can be many reasons for ex-post failure but the 
most common is corruption. One can however think of lack of sufficient infrastructure 
facilities to monitor violation of norms, laxity in monitoring, or a lack of corresponding legal 
authority in the hands of the monitoring agents to be effective regulators. A well-known 
version of the private interest theory of regulation is that the idea that regulatory agencies 
typically undergo a life cycle in response to the political environment and as time passes by 
and the interests of the people shift away from this policy, these agencies become vulnerable 
to domination by regulated interests. Many times the lack of public attention, expert 
information being supplied by the party under regulation, or the recruitment of ‘experts’ 
from the regulated industries can all weaken the regulatory agency and it’s policy. 
Which of these factors explains ex-post regulatory failure is an empirical question and would 
vary with each case. Documentation of Regulatory failure of both kinds can be done by 
analyzing the legislative process that led to the enactment of particular acts and to compare 
the norms that the act was based on (expert committee recommendations) with the final Act 
that was legislated. If there were no good reasons given for any dilution of the committee 
recommendations then one can conclude the presence of interest groups at work. Secondly, 
if data on the actual harm levels is obtained after the Act comes into effect, a consistently higher 
level of harm as compared to the standard set by the act would be an indicator of regulatory 
failure of the second kind. In some cases, the number of executive petitions filed (i.e. petitions 
that are filed by victims in the event enforcing agents fail to comply with the enforcement of 
the legislated standard) can also be an indicator of failure at the level of implementation. In 
                                                 
15 See Stigler- Peltsman model of private interest theory of regulation. 
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the next section we use the evidence on the decision of the Supreme Court to close down 
industrial units in New Delhi, following a public Interest petition to assess the efficiency of 
such a mechanism to bring about the economically efficient outcome. 
 
A) The case of Delhi Air Pollution 
We have chosen Delhi as a case to substantiate our hypothesis to show that the conditions 
under which Public Interest Litigation is an effective legal procedure were largely met in this 
case. In Delhi there were a number of policy initiatives such as committees and regulatory 
authorities constituted in the 90’s to assess, monitor and control pollution. Still Delhi’s level 
of air pollution is much higher compared to other major cities in India16, where the major 
contributors are unrestrained vehicular traffic and industrial units situated in non-
conforming residential and sensitive areas. None of the regulatory measures seem to have 
worked till mid 1990’s.  
Things have improved only after Supreme Court of India, responding to a PIL petition, 
issued orders to the concerned authorities. We, first, summarize the initiatives taken by the 
government such as regulatory authorities and committees constituted to analyze and find 
ways to check pollution, particularly air pollution. In the process we establish that regulatory 
approach to abate pollution in India succumbed to interest group lobbies and failed even in 
implementing the existing environmental statues. Subsequently we list the directives given by 
the Court in response to PILs that resulted reduction in pollution in Delhi in the late 1990’s. 
B) Acts, Legislation And Enforcement Authorities    
The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1981 envisaged establishing Pollution 
Control Boards in the States to monitor and control air and noise pollution level through 
licensing. The Environment (Protection) Act 1986 included a nation wide strategy for 
controlling air pollution and further was strengthened in 1994. National Ambient Air Quality 
Standard for the country (NAAQS) was set through notifications in 1982 and 1994.  
                                                 
16 Delhi is one of the ten most polluted cities of the world (Brandon and Hamman, 1995, Kathuria, 2001). 
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There were specific policy initiatives for Delhi state alone. Delhi Development Authority 
(DDA) was created under Delhi Development Act of 1957 for the planned development of 
Delhi. The Delhi Master Plan (perspective) 2001 was introduced in the ’80s and set out the 
pollution emission standards in National Capital Region. Different standards have been 
specified for industrial, residential and sensitive zones. National Ambient Air Quality 
Monitoring Programme (NAPM) and National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) 
were set up by the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) to identify and monitor the 
pollution level and regularly appraise pollution control programs in the city. More than 280 
stations nationwide were set up to monitor and record the emission levels by collecting 24 
hourly and annual averages for many of the pollutants were collected and compiled.  
Delhi Pollution Control Committee was constituted17 under the Water (Prevention and 
Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 
and was further strengthened in 2002 under various acts such as Hazardous Waste 
(Management & Handling) Rules, 1989 and Noise Pollution (Regulation & Control) Rules, 
2000. This committee was bestowed with power to assess and prevent pollution in the 
Union Territory of Delhi, replacing Central Pollution Control Board. The major function of 
the Committee is to specify effluent standards for automobiles, industrial plants, and any 
other polluting source and also take steps for the prevention and abatement of air and water 
pollution.  
C) Evidence of Capture: Dilution of Standards  
A committee under H.B. Mathur of Indian Institute of Technology, New Delhi was set up 
to recommend vehicular emission norms for 1995-2000. There were specialized sub-
committees under S. Raju of the automotive research association of India to recommend on 
petrol cars and B.P Pundir of Indian institute of petroleum for diesel vehicles. Industrialists 
protested against the Mathur committee recommendations and Ministry of Environment 
And Forest (MoEF) opted for a softer version of the recommendation in 1993. Further 
more the lobby group succeeded in postponing the date of the enforcement of the 
committee recommendations by one year from April 1995 to April 1996. These two 
committees set the pollution standards for industrial and vehicular pollution in the capital 
                                                 
17 S.O. 198(E) 
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tertiary of Delhi. But there were lots of opposition to the standards and eventually the 
lobbyists succeeded in diluting the standards (Divan and Rozencranz, 2001). Also there are 
multiple authorities to implement the set standards. But the regulatory authorities seem to 
have failed in controlling air pollution in Delhi. As is evident in the pollution data of the 
early 90’s, the pollution level of SO2, NO2 and SPM had been on the rise in the early 90’s. 
Table:1 indicates that the statues enacted, standard set and government machinery 
responsible for pollution control did not succeed in effectively controlling air pollution in 
Delhi. Particularly Suspended Particulate Matter in the air is phenomenally high compared to 
the international standard. The reason could be laxity in enforcement and enforcement was 
not mandatory for the agencies in the sense that the enforcement agencies were not 
accountable to any higher authority.  
D) Ex post Regulatory Failure 
The second type of regulatory failure that was discussed refers to the inability of 
enforcement authority to bring about a compliance level to the recommended standards. 
Comparing the recommended standard at the time of its implementation can easily 
substantiate evidence of this and the subsequent pollution levels as measured by monitoring 
units in the city. If the records show that pollution levels were consistently higher than the 
recommended levels in the year subsequent to the enactment of the Acts, this would be 
indicative of ex post failure. The table below shows that all the three pollutants were showing 
an increasing trend in the early 90s.   
16 
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E) PIL as an Alternative form of Control      
Supreme Court of India was active in abating pollution in Delhi. Replying to a PIL case in 
1990 the Court demanded the city administration to submit a complete list of acting taken 
against the environmental tort feasors and also directed the state to explore the possibilities 
of reducing pollution18. Subsequently the Court asked the government to form a high-
powered committee, the K.N.Saikia Committee to assess the low cost technological 
alternatives and new legal solutions19.  The Court was active through out this period as it was 
concerned of strengthening the prosecution of defaulters20, reducing the pollution by the 
Delhi Transport Corporation buses by ordering them to change to gas21. The Division Bench 
of Supreme Court consisting of Justice Kuldip Singh and Justice S Saghir Ahamad in 1995 
directed the Delhi Government to set up a committee to study industrial concentration in 
non-conforming areas such as colonies and other residential pockets.  
                                                 
18 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13029 of 1985, order dated 14 November 1990 
19 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13029 of 1985, order dated 19 February 1991 
20 1991 (2) SCC 137 
21 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13029 of 1985, order dated 3 October 1991 and 25 October 1991; it was 
extended to all public buses (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13029 of 1985, order dated 8 January 1992) and all 
government vehicle were ordered to shift CNG (26 April 1996) 
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The Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority for NCR of Delhi was constituted 
under the guidance of SC for protecting and improving the quality of the environment and 
preventing, controlling and abating environmental pollution. In May 1992 SC had ordered all 
stone crushers along Delhi-Faridabad boarder close or shift away from Delhi as they were 
polluting Delhi air. In 1995, as per the Court order, individual notice had been sent to 8378 
industries asking them to relocate or stop functioning as they are polluting industries and or 
functioning in non-conforming areas specified in Delhi Master Plan.  
In the subsequent notifications SC had made its point clear that forms that are noxious and 
hazardous particularly industries that fall under the category of ‘H(a)’ and ‘H(b)’ should be 
relocated in a stipulated time of three years and other not noxious but nuisance causing units 
should move out in four years22. More than 1,300 industrial units have been closed. The 
Supreme Court has ordered closure of industries as per the details given below.  
The Delhi Government under directions from the Supreme Court has identified 102 acres of 
developed land in the existing industrial estates and seven other locations with an area of 
approximately 4,800 acres for relocation of the industries. 1,300 acres have been notified for 
acquisition and development of new industrial estates for relocation of industrial units. More 
importantly the Court had directed the polluting industrial units to contribute 20% towards 
building 28 Common Effluent Treating Plants and take the liability of another 30% as loan 
from Industrial Development Bank of India or face closure.  
Electrostatic precipitators have been installed at the three power plants to control particulate 
emissions such as Sulphur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen and particulates. Sulphur dioxide and 
oxides of nitrogen are emitted through stacks of specified height to facilitate wider dispersal 
so that the ground level concentrations of these gaseous pollutants are kept controlled. Stack 
monitoring is being done on a regular basis. 
                                                 
22 Delhi Master Plan has categorized the industries in Delhi into A to H. of that H category has been 
subdivided into ‘H(a)’, which include noxious and hazardous industries such as Cellulosic Products, 
Cement and Refractories, Explosive and Ammunition, Fertilizers, Inorganic and Organic Chemical 
Industries, Leather and Other Animal Products, Metallurgical Industries, Paper and Paper Products, Poison, 
Radioactive Elements and Rubber Industries and ‘H(b)’, heavy and large industries.  
18 
Regarding vehicular pollution the Court came out with a series of orders that directs the 
pollution control authorities to execute the standards set by various committees and 
boards23. As an affidavit filled by the CPCB attributes more than 2/3 of the pollution to 
vehicles particularly the diesel run two wheeler, the Court had ordered all the new diesel 
vehicles to be registered after June 1999 in Delhi should abide to Euro-1 emission norms 
and vehicles to be registered after 2000 April should abide to EURO II emission norms24. 
Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority for the National Capital Region 
states in a report on clean fuels that Sulphur content in diesel and petrol was ordered to be 
reduced to a maximum of 0.25% and 0.10% respectively and steps were taken to control 
Benzene and lead in petrol (EPCA, 2001). All vehicles that are 15 years and older were 
phased out. All government vehicles were asked to convert to CNG.     
The above said measures seem to have worked in reducing pollution in the city. There is a 
drastic reduction in the level of Suspended Particulate Matters in the air of Delhi. The 
reduction in the mid 90’s has been sustained even further, particularly SPM level shows a 
clear reduction right after 1996 court intervention in redeploying or shutting down of 
polluting industries and later its involvement in reducing vehicular pollution.  It reached the 
acceptable level of 360 µg/m3. The other two major pollutants namely SOx and NOx also 
seem to have moderated in the same period (Parivesh, 1999).  
 
                                                 
23 1998 (6) SCC 63 and AIR 1999 SC 291 
24 1999 (6) SCC 12 
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The above diagram captures the time trend of pollutants SO2 and NO2. Over years SO2 and 
NO2 concentration in the air has been brought down, particularly in the mid 90’s. 
Committee of Auto Fuel Policy states that in most of the major cities the level of pollutants 
such as SOx, NOx, SPM and PM10 has gone down in 2000 comparing to that of 1995. The 
reasons for the reduction in pollution in Delhi could be attributed to court activism.  
Responding to some of the public interest litigations the Supreme Court of India, assuming a 
proactive and progressive role of judiciary ordered to close down those companies that 
pollute the ambient of Delhi. More importantly to involve the public in the process of 
fighting environmental pollution SC had made it mandatory for the theaters, TV and radio 
stations to run environmental programs.  
VI 
Summary and Conclusions  
We have shown in the paper that PILs have played a lead role in enforcing the 
environmental standards in the Indian context. Despite of strict environmental standards 
and the presence of regulatory authorities air pollution level in Delhi was exceeding the 
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acceptable levels. Not surprisingly there were no private litigation or class action against 
individual industrial units even thought many of them were situated in non-conforming 
residential areas in Delhi. This shows that private litigations and class actions are generally 
inadequate to resolve mass environmental torts. It was quite evident in this case that 
regulation too have failed due to ex ante and ex post captures. The government has softened 
the standards set by committees and even the reduced standards were not implemented 
effectively.  
PILs and Supreme Court’s environmental activism have resulted in reduction air pollution in 
Delhi. SPM, SOX, NOX have shown reducing trend in the late 90s and reached the 
acceptable level through court order to redeploy non-conforming polluting industrial units 
and adopt stringent vehicular emission standards. As it is argued PILs increase the number 
of potential litigants enormously, thus increases the deterrence effects, which in turn 
increases the expected cost of trail of the potential tort feasor. But deterrence effect is not 
evident from Delhi pollution case, as it is one of earliest of its kind. However it took 10 years 
to pass the judgment on a PIL case filed by Mr.M.C.Metha and court has issued as many as 
52 directives in this regard. Even though PIL has resulted in reducing pollution, the time 
taken for this to happen shows that there are costs of implementing court decisions, which 
are generally not taken into consideration in standard analysis. The possibility that PIL could 
be used in the future to cater to private interests is also not ruled out and unless more cases 
are studied, the hypothesis that PILs are unambiguously welfare improving cannot be 
deduced. This paper takes only the first step towards a more complete analysis of the 
economic Efficiency of PIL. 
 
 
21 
Bibliography  
Bardhan K. Pranab (2000), “Understanding Underdevelopment: Challenges for Institutional 
Economics from the Point of View of Poor Countries,” Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics 156, 1: 224. 
Baxi, U (1987), ‘Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation’ in Tiruchelvam and 
Coomaraswamy, eds. The Role of the Judiciary in Plural Societies New York, St. 
Martin’s Press. 
Brandon C. and K. Hommann (1995), The cost of Inaction: Valuing the Economy-wide cost 
of Environmental Degradation in India, United Nations University, Symposium on 
Global Sustainability (Proceedings), Tokyo, October. 
Cane P. (1981), The Function of Standing Rules in Administrative Law, Public Law, 
reprinted in D.J. Galligan (ed), ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1992). 
Che, Y.-K. (1996) ‘Equilibrium formation of class action suits’, Journal of Public Economics, 
62:339-61 
Cunningham, C (1987), ‘Public Interest Litigation in Indian Supreme Court: A Study in the 
Light of American Experience’ in Journal of the Indian Law Institute 29(4). 
Delhi Urban Environment and Infrastructure Improvement Project (DUEIIP) Delhi 2021, 
Ministry of Environment and Forests and Government of National Capital Territory 
of Delhi (Planning Department), Government of India, New Delhi. MoEF & 
NCTD 2001  
Desai H. Ashok and S. Muralidhar (2000), “Public Interest Litigations: Potential and 
Problems”, B.N.Kirpal et.al. (eds.), “Supreme Court not Infallible – Essays in Honor 
of the Supreme Court of India”, New Delhi: OUP, 2000, p.159. 
Divan, Shyam and Armin Rozencranz, (2001), Environmental Law and Policy in India: Cases, 
Materials and Statutes, Oxford University Press, Second Edition, New Delhi. 
Epstein A. Richard, (2003), “Class Actions Aggregation, and Distortion”, The Law School 
The University of Chicago, httpwww.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
Hershkoff, Helen (unknown), Public Interest Litigation: Selected Issues and Examples, 
www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/PublicInterestLitigation.doc (Site last 
visited, 26/11/04).    
John, J (1996), Labour and Environment: the Case of Delhi’s Polluting Industries, Labour 
File, Volume 2 No. 5 & 6 May & June 1996. 
Kapur, Jagga (Ed.) (1999), “Supreme Court on Public Interest Litigation” Vol.1, LIPS 
Publication, SCALE, A-43 at A-53. 
Kathuria Vinish (2001) Vehicular Pollution control in Delhi, India - Are the efforts enough? 
http://www.beijer.kva.se/publications/pdf-archive/Disc144.pdf 
Miller, G. 1998. "Class Action" In Peter Newman, ed., The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law, Macmillan Reference Limited, 257-262 
Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, “Policy Statement for 
Abatement of Pollution”, para 3.3, February 26, 1992 
22 
Muralidhar S, (2003), India: Public Interest Litigation - Survey 1997-98, published in Annual 
Survey of Indian Law 525.  
Ott and Schäfer, (1996) “Widening the Scope of Environmental Liability”, Erling Ide and 
Roger van den Bergh, Eds, Law and Economics of the Environment, (J & F), p. 109-
114 
Pani, Sukanya (2002) Comparative Analysis of Environmental Activism through Constitutional Rights: 
Two Case Studies: India and Hong Kong, National Academy of Legal Studies and 
Research (NALSAR), University of Law, Hyderabad, India 
Raja, A.V and Xavier, Francis R (2005) “Efficiency and Strategic Behaviour: The case of 
Mass Torts” Working Paper, Dept. of Economics, University of Hyderabad. 
Report of the Expert Committee on Auto Fuel Policy, August 2002, New Delhi, India. GOI 
2002 
Schaefer, (2000) “The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class 
Action and Legal Actions Taken by Associations,” European Journal of Law and 
Economics 183 
Silver, Charles (2000), “Class Actions - Representative Proceedings,” in V Encyclopedia of 
Law and Economics 194 (Bouckaert and Geest eds.,) 
Spulber, D. (1988) Regulation and Markets, MIT Press 
Status Report on Ambient Air Quality, New Delhi, Central Pollution Control Board, 
Government of India CPCB: 1991 & 1996 
Tiwari G.S. (2001), “Conservation of Biodiversity and Techniques of People’s Activism”, 43 
Journal of the Indian Law Institute  
Vishnupriya, Y (1995), ‘Public Interest Litigation in India’ Indian Socio-Legal Journal 21(1-
2). 
 
 
